Memorandum DATE: February 26, 1999

TO: Secretary of Transportation

FROM: Hunaid Sulemanji

RE: FAA and Air Traffic Controllers
 
 

 Executive Summary

In 1981, the 12,000 members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Union (PATCO), went on a strike after months of negotiations failed with the federal government. The threefold reason for the strike was across the board salary increase, reduced workweek, and a better retirement package. These controllers were dismissed by the President for engaging in unlawful activity by striking (members of the public service sector are not allowed to strike by the law). The attention failed to uncover the fundamental problems within the FAA; management-worker relationships and control of the workplace. For the most part, FAA has been known to have a centralized, rigid, and insensitive system of managing people. Poor communication, weak management support systems, and little concern for employees are fundamentally integrated characteristics of FAA management. In analyzing the FAA’s structure, the following problems are uncovered; Stress, Access, Automation, Overstaffing, Supervision, Safety Responsibility, and Pay.

The immediate problems are related to stress and working hours. Lack of up-to-date equipment is also another fundamental problem because not only it makes the skies unsafe, but adds the external stressors to the job of the controllers. Government bureaucracy is plaguing the FAA in areas of quality, efficiency, and productivity to operate successfully.

My recommendation is to investigate the possibility of privatizing the air traffic control system or creating an independent agency to act on behalf of the FAA (totally independent of the FAA) to address the problems with internal communications, managing the flow of people within the organization, compensation and rewards according to policies and theories (equity and expectancy), and elimination of external stress factors and reduction in working hours.

Although unlawful for the public sector, the 12,000 federally employed air traffic controllers, members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Union (PATCO), went on a strike after months of negotiations failed with the federal government.

In analyzing the conditions before and after the strike, the following fundamental human resources problems are uncovered through the concepts of human resources management systems of Employee Influence, Human Resources Flow, Reward Systems, and Work Systems:

Employee Influence:

This perspective deals with responsibility, authority, and power delegated by managers to employees. The stakeholders in the air traffic control systems are air traffic controllers, the public, airline industries (business, pilots, employees), FAA employees (such as managers and supervisors), the government, the union (PATCO and others), and other businesses relying on the airline industry.

PATCO’s strategy failed on all accounts, the government (FAA) was anticipating this move and was prepared with new contingency plans for operations. Perhaps the key was the failure of other unions to support PATCO for fear of losing their own jobs and political leverage because the strike was well within the confine being unlawful. Furthermore, the airlines were determined that PATCO’s militancy was a greater threat than short term loses, and the public did not respond to PATCO’s claim that the FAA system was unsafe.

Human Resources Flow:

This perspective deals with managing the flow of people into, through, and out of the organization. It is very apparent that FAA has a poor management system and HRM policies with respect to recruitment, selection, and promotion practices. The FAA had devised no standard method of measuring performance and proficiency of controllers, and supervisors exercised their own criteria and judgment in approving controllers. The major problems uncovered in this section are:

  • Overstaffing - It was reported that the technological innovation would enable the FAA’s system to handle 50 percent growth in air traffic over the next decade without significant increase in the number of controllers. However, the FAA made no attempt to bring about the reduction in the work force.
  • Supervision - Supervisors were promoted within the ranks of the air traffic controllers, in some instances based on a "buddy" system. Most had a high school education with no management skills, and training for effective supervision was not provided. Therefore, there was a resentment in the culture of the controllers because of unfair practices of pay and promotion.
    •  Reward System:

    This perspective relates to how rewards can influence employee attitudes and behavior. Proper compensation shapes and focuses employee behavior. The controllers were convinced, through the equity theory, that the compensation system was unfair in comparison to pilots and supervisors with respect to responsibility and airline safety. The comparison of controllers in the world market through external equity theory provided justifiable reasons for unfairness based on the working hours and retirement benefits, the two primary of the several conditions of the strike.

    Work Systems:

    This perspective focuses on the arrangement of people, information, tasks, and technology at all levels of the organization. The FAA possessed a monopoly over the training and recruiting the controllers. With specialized skills and in most cases limited education, the controllers had limited options but to work for the FAA and therefore FAA had a strong hand in dealing with the arrangement of people and the workforce. Further analysis under this section uncovered the following:

  • Stress - Due to the nature and characteristics of the job, the controllers were likely to be under stress. However, the FAA (as an employer) may have forced additional external stress by incorporating obsolete, faulty, and unergonomical equipment, and the autocratic management and a system which included little reward and a fear of burnout. In addition, the perception of the FAA management provided for the low morale, and intense and chronic feelings of alienation because the controllers felt they were the "scapegoats when things went wrong".
  • Access - FAA’s policy of allowing airlines with unlimited access to airport created an increase in peak activity and the gap between peak and valley activity, and therefore a precursor to stress.
  • Automation - Technology and computerization may be making the controllers job increasingly obsolete, however, it appears the FAA failed to communicate the information, tasks, and processes with respect to a revised role of a controller in a changed environment.
  • Safety Responsibilities - Most controllers felt that the final responsibility of safety of aircraft was in their hands, and yet they could exercise only a limited control over the operation of traffic system. FAA had poor communication systems to educate the controllers that the final responsibility lies in the team concept.
    •  Conclusion and Recommendations

    It is apparent that the struggle between the FAA management and the controllers for control of workplace is continuing despite congressional investigations, recommendations, and supposed improvements. The tone and issues appear to be the same, and the perception of management and controllers are world apart. Although technology management theories, modes of production, labor’s position, and cultural views of work and workers have all changed, the struggle for power and fundamental conflicts remain the same.

    It is my opinion that these recommendations can be centralized and perhaps create a privatization or an independent private sector to carry out the duties of air traffic control system. If the pilots are within the private sector with their own union, it is possible to outsource similar services for the air traffic control system. The following recommendations are proposed to avert the future strike and improve the labor management conditions.

  • First and foremost, FAA has to establish a harmoniously working relationship between the current union and the government and to focus on the primary goal of the business - maximum safety of the airline industry. Perhaps develop an Immunity Provision administered by an outside committee to encourage flow of information between controllers, supervisors, managers, and external entities for exchange of information without the fear of retribution or ridicule.
  • FAA has to steer away from the autocratic and authoritarian management style. The immediate focus needs to be on the motivation factor which is a set of processes that arouse, direct, and maintain human behavior. FAA needs to incorporate a separate and independent HRM initiatives (perhaps through the use of outsourced consultant) to carry out the primary functions of managing the flow of people within the organization. The independent consultant can evaluate a degree of "fit between the HRM and controllers, and institute proper policies targeted at recruitment, selection, and promotion practices.
  • The inputs (time and effort) vs. outputs (pay, fringe benefits, prestige) are not consistent according to the equity theory. In addition, according to the expectancy theory, the controllers are not motivated because they are unable to achieve the things from their jobs. FAA needs to assign an independent council to design an appropriate pay structure by evaluating the compensation philosophy and benchmark the jobs of the controller. In addition, standards are required in place for performance evaluation and effective promotion of individuals.
  • FAA needs to eliminate the precursor to external stress that is imposed on by the obsolescence, faulty, and unergonomical equipment. Counseling needs to be provided to assist employees with addiction problems of drinking and smoking, which appears to be the cause of further external stress. Allowance must be made to limit the number of hours each controller works, and proper compensation for hours worked beyond the call of duty.
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    References:

  • Human Resources Management: An Experimental Approach; H. John Bernardin and Joyce E. A. Russell, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 1997
  • Management, Third Edition; Kathryn M. Bartol and David C. Martin, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 1997
  • The pressures of PATCO: Strikes and Stress in the 1980s; Rebecca Pels (http://www.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH37/Pels.html)
  • The Air controllers Strike of 1981 (http://www.researchcentral.com/cgi-bin/results.idc)
  • Something’s Got to Give; Darcy Frey, The New York Times Magazine, March 24, 1996
  • A guide to basic law and procedures under the National Labor Relations Act; US Government Printing Office 1991
  • An ATC Controller’s Perspective (http://airlinesafety.com/controller.html)
  • US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; No. 1146 -- August Term, 1995; Docket No. 95-6226 (http://www.tourolaw.edu/2ndcircuit/june96/95-6226.html)
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